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The remuneration of directors is a controversial issue in many jurisdictions in the light of
the global financial crisis and the escalating remuneration packages of directors. One way
of managing the escalating levels of directors’ remuneration is to compel companies to
disclose the details of directors’ remuneration packages. Full disclosure of the remuneration
of directors would increase transparency and accountability in the remuneration-setting
process of directors. This article explores the adequacy of the Companies Act 71 of 2008
in relation to the disclosure of directors’ remuneration. It further examines the disclosure
requirements of directors’ remuneration under the JSE Listings Requirements and the
King Report on Governance for South Africa, 2016 (‘King IV’). It compares South
Africa’s remuneration disclosure requirements with the legislative standards for remunera-
tion disclosure under the Companies Act 2006 of the United Kingdom, and examines
whether our disclosure requirements meet the standards of the UK Companies Act, 2006.
This article concludes that the minimum standards of remuneration disclosure set by the
Companies Act are too low to satisfy enhanced transparency, and suggests various
proposals for strengthening the disclosure requirements of directors’ remuneration under the
Companies Act.
I INTRODUCTION
The remuneration of directors has become a controversial and sensitive issue
in many jurisdictions in view of the global ﬁnancial crisis and the escalating
remuneration packages of directors, particularly in public listed companies.
The practices among ﬁnancial institutions that contributed to the global
ﬁnancial crisis have fuelled widespread concern that the high levels of
directors’ remuneration need to be controlled, and that the market has failed
to do so.
The Companies Act 71 of 2008, as amended, does address the issue of the
remuneration of directors. However, the question arises whether the
provisions relating to the disclosure of the remuneration of directors are
adequate.
This article explores the adequacy of the Companies Act in dealing with
the disclosure of the remuneration of directors. Part II of the article examines
the rationale for the high levels of directors’ remuneration. It explores
further in part III the policy justiﬁcations for using remuneration disclosure
as a technique to address exorbitant levels of the remuneration of directors.
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Part IV of this article examines the disclosure requirements of the remunera-
tion of directors that are applicable under the Companies Act, the Listings
Requirements of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (‘the JSE Listings
Requirements’) and the King Report on Corporate Governance for South
Africa, 2016 (‘the King IV Report’). Part V of this article compares South
Africa’s remuneration disclosure requirements with the legislative standards
for remuneration disclosure under the Companies Act, 2006 of the United
Kingdom (‘the UK Companies Act, 2006’), and examines whether the
requirements for remuneration disclosure under the South African Compa-
nies Act meet the standards of the UK Companies Act, 2006. Finally, in part
VI, this article suggests certain proposals for legislative reform of the
Companies Act in regard to the disclosure requirements of the remuneration
of directors.
II SOME REASONS FOR THE HIGH LEVELS OF REMUNERA-
TION OF DIRECTORS
There is a lack of consensus regarding the reasons for the high levels of
directors’ remuneration in public and private companies. One of the main
reasons advocated for the high remuneration levels of directors is that they
reﬂect the size and complexity of executive jobs in modern times, as well as
the higher risks and greater responsibilities associated with them.1 Another
reason given for the high levels of directors’ remuneration is the need for
companies to compete with global markets for a relatively small available
pool of competent directors.2 Thus companies adopt the position that they
need to pay higher remuneration to directors in order to attract the few
available skilled directors. Even though this position is often regarded as a
self-serving myth and is criticised,3 companies are unlikely to ignore the
beneﬁts of being able to recruit, incentivise, and retain, suitable global
talent.4
A further reason for the high levels of directors’ remuneration is attributed
to the shift from a ﬁxed basic salary model towards incentive-based
payments.5 The agency theory regards directors as agents of the company’s
shareholders. Therefore, in order to minimise the principal/agent problem
experienced by companies,6 companies tend to increase the use of manage-
1 See John Shields, Michael O’Donnel & John O’Brien ‘The bucks stop here:
Private sector executive remuneration in Australia’A Report prepared for the Labor
Council of New South Wales (2003) 12, available at http://www.researchgate.net/
publication/242042789, accessed on 17 March 2017. See generally Michael E Porter,
Jay W Lorsch & Nitin Nohria ‘Seven Surprises for new CEOs’ (2004) 82 Harvard
Business Review 62.
2 Shields, O’Donnel &O’Brien ibid.
3 Ibid at 12–13.
4 Ibid at 18.
5 Ibid at 13.
6 The principal/agent problem in corporate governance refers to the misalign-
ment of the interests of directors (who have been given the power to manage the
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rial incentives such as annual performance bonuses, share-option schemes
and long-term incentive schemes that seek to align the interests of directors
with those of shareholders.7Directors often make signiﬁcant gains from these
short-term and long-term incentives. In the absence of sound corporate-
governance practices, these performance-based remuneration methods may
potentially be manipulated by directors for self-gain.8 For instance, most of
these incentives may be devoid of truly challenging performance require-
ments. They may be determined using short-term focused, less challenging,
and inappropriate, criteria.9 As a result, the high incentives paid to the
directors may not be truly reﬂective of performance.
The escalating remuneration packages may also be attributed to the
deﬁciencies in the process by which directors’ remuneration is determined.10
Under s 66(1) of the Companies Act the board of directors is in control of the
management of the company. The directors of companies with dispersed
shareholding are generally far more powerful than the shareholders, and their
powers are deeply entrenched as there is a strict separation of powers.
Furthermore, South Africa has a unitary board structure, comprising both
executive and non-executive directors. The chief executive ofﬁcer, chief
ﬁnancial ofﬁcer and other executive heads often sit on the same board with
the non-executive directors. There is thus a high possibility of conﬂict of
interests when the same board has to determine the remuneration of the
employees of the company, including that of the executive and the
non-executive directors.11
Although the appointment of remuneration committees (comprised of
non-executive directors who are independent of executive management)
may be an important procedural improvement to ensure objectivity in
the pay-setting process,12 the Companies Act does not speciﬁcally require
affairs of the company) and those of shareholders. There is a likelihood that the
directors (agents) will prioritise their own immediate interests at the expense of the
long-term interests of the shareholders (principal). See generally Allen Sykes ‘Over-
coming poor value executive remuneration: Resolving the manifest conﬂicts of
interest’ (2002) 10 Corporate Governance: An International Review 256; Alistair Bruce,
Trevor Buck & Brian GMMain ‘Top executive remuneration:Aview from Europe’
(2005) 42 Journal of Management Studies 1493 at 1494–6; and Shields, O’Donnel &
O’Brien op cit note 1 at 13.
7 See Bruce, Buck&Main ibid at 1494–5.
8 Sykes op cit note 6 at 256–9.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid at 256–60; Jennifer Hill ‘What reward have ye? Disclosure of director and
executive remuneration inAustralia’ (1996) 14Company and Securities Law Journal 232
at 237.
11 Tshepo Mongalo ‘Shareholder activism in the United Kingdom highlights the
failure of remuneration committees: Lessons for SouthAfrica’ (2003) 120 SALJ 756 at
760–3; Hill op cit note 10 at 236–7; Guido Ferrarini & Niamh Moloney ‘Executive
remuneration in the EU: The context for reform’ (2005) 21Oxford Review of Economic
Policy 304 at 309.
12 Hill op cit note 10 at 235; Ferrarini &Moloney op cit note 11 at 310.
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companies to appoint remuneration committees.13 In any event, the effec-
tiveness of the independent remuneration committees may be hampered by a
number of factors, including feelings of friendship and loyalty amongst
executive and non-executive directors. As a result, these committees have
not always been effective.14 Executive directors are therefore often able to
inﬂuence their own remuneration packages.
The escalating levels of the remuneration of directors may have a
damaging impact on companies, employees, shareholders, creditors, the
economy, and society in general.15 They may also exacerbate the income
inequalities and labour unrest in South Africa, and threaten social cohesion.16
There are valid reasons to curb high levels of the remuneration of directors,
particularly in South Africa, in light of the widening gap between the
earnings of executive directors and the rest of the employees, as well as the
wealth gap between rich and poor.17
One way of managing the escalating levels of the remuneration of
directors and to control the conﬂict of interests and the danger of self-dealing
which is inherent in the remuneration-setting process, is to compel compa-
nies to disclose the details of the remuneration packages of directors, the
process by which they are determined, and their links to performance.18 This
is discussed further below.
13 See the King IVReport at 57 paras 65–7 on the remuneration committee.
14 SeeMahmoud Ezzamel &RobertWatson ‘Market comparison earnings and the
bidding-up of executive cash compensation: Evidence from the United Kingdom’
(1998) 41 The Academy of Management Journal 221 at 222; Mongalo op cit note 11 at
760–3; Hill op cit note 10 at 235; Charles MYablon ‘Overcompensating: The corpo-
rate lawyer and executive pay’ (1992) 92Columbia LR 1867 at 1873; Sykes op cit note
6 at 257; Lucian A Bebchuk & Jesse M Fried ‘Pay without performance’ in F Scott
Kieff &TroyAParedes (eds) Perspectives on Corporate Governance (2010) 125.
15 H E Scholtz & A Smit ‘Executive remuneration and company performance for
SouthAfrican companies listed on theAlternative Exchange (AltX)’ (2012) 16 South-
ern African Business Review 21 at 22; and Stephanie M Luiz ‘Executive remuneration
and shareholder voting’ (2013) 25 SA Merc LJ 267 at 267.
16 SeeMongalo op cit note 11 at 760.
17 It has been observed that South Africa is one of the most unequal nations in the
world, and inequality is a threat to development and long term sustainability. See
Gabriela Inchauste, Nora Lustig, Maboshe Maskekwa et al Fiscal Policy and Redistribu-
tion in an Unequal Society: The Case of South Africa Economic Update No 6 (2014),
available at http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southafrica/publication/south-africa-
economic-update-fiscal-policy-redistribution-unequal-society, accessed on 17 March 2017;
Oxfam ‘Even it up: Time to end extreme inequality’ (2015), available at https://www.
oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/cr-even-it-up-extreme-inequality-
291014-summ-en.pdf, accessed on 17 March 2017. See also PricewaterhouseCoopers
Executive Directors’ Remuneration Practices and Trends Report 6 ed (2014) South Africa
available at http://www.pwc.co.za/en_ZA/za/assets/pdf/executive-directors-remuneration-
report-july–2014.pdf, accessed on 17March 2017.
18 See Ferrarini &Moloney op cit note 11 at 312 andHill op cit note 10 at 236–9.
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III THE RATIONALE FOR FULL REMUNERATION DISCLO-
SURE
One of the reasons advocated for full disclosure of the remuneration of
directors is that the availability of accurate information increases transparency
and accountability, as s 7(b)(iii) of the Companies Act requires.19 Greater
transparency would enable shareholders to monitor the board and the
remuneration committee more effectively.20
One way in which shareholder monitoring may be exercised is through
voting on the actual remuneration packages proposed at shareholders’
meetings.21 For instance, shareholders have a right to vote on a special
resolution to approve the remuneration of the company’s directors for their
service as directors in terms of s 66(9) of the Companies Act (which will be
discussed further below). Shareholder monitoring may also be exercised
through direct engagement with companies in order to improve their
remuneration policies and practices.22 Engagement enables shareholders to
express their concerns related to directors’ remuneration directly to a
company’s board of directors or remuneration committee. The presentation
of the ﬁnancial statements, containing details of directors’ and prescribed
ofﬁcers’ remuneration, to the shareholders’ meeting in terms of s 30(3)(d) of
the Companies Act (which will be discussed further below) affords share-
holders an opportunity to engage with company boards on remuneration
matters. Such shareholder monitoring mechanisms must be supported by the
appropriate disclosure of directors’ remuneration in order to be effective.
Appropriate disclosure would enable the shareholders and other stake-
holders to make an informed evaluation of directors’ remuneration and to
assess whether or not it is justiﬁed.23 It would also enable them to ‘identify
and combat undesirable practices’24 in remuneration arrangements. The
disclosure of performance metrics and targets for performance-based remu-
neration would assist shareholders and stakeholders in assessing the extent to
which the remuneration is linked to performance and the long-term value of
the company.25
19 In terms of s 7(b)(iii) of the Companies Act, one of the purposes of the Act is to
encourage transparency and high standards of corporate governance, given the role
that companies play in the country’s social and economic life. See also Debbie Collier,
Kathy Idensohn & Jill Adkins ‘Income inequality and executive remuneration:
Assessing the role of law and policy in the pursuit of equality’ (2010) 34 South African
Journal of Labour Relations 84 at 94 and Ferrarini &Moloney op cit note 11 at 311.
20 Ferrarini &Moloney ibid; Kym Sheehan ‘The regulatory framework for execu-
tive remuneration inAustralia’ (2009) 31 Sydney LR 273 at 291.
21 Sheehan ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Stephanie M Luiz ‘An appropriate regime for the remuneration of executives’
(2006) 39CILSA 57 at 65.
24 Collier, Idensohn&Adkins op cit note 19 at 94.
25 See Guido Ferrarini, Niamh Moloney &Maria Cristina Ungureanu ‘Executive
remuneration in crisis: A critical assessment of reforms in Europe’ (2010) 10 Journal of
Corporate Law Studies 73 at 86.
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Effective disclosure may further reduce the agency costs associated with
directors’ remuneration by making information on remuneration, and any
potential conﬂict of interests in the process of determining such remunera-
tion, readily available to shareholders.26 It may also play a role in addressing
conﬂict-of-interest risks in the remuneration-setting process and in focusing
the board’s attention on company performance and shareholder interests.27
Full remuneration disclosure may thus enhance investor protection and
conﬁdence in the market.28 This is in line with the promotion of investment
in South African markets envisaged in s 7(c) of the Companies Act.
Another reason advanced for the importance of the disclosure of the
remuneration of directors is that it may lead to increased scrutiny, which may
have deterrent effects on excessive remuneration and mere wealth appropria-
tion by self-serving and opportunistic executive directors who are able to
inﬂuence their own remuneration packages.29 It may discourage a situation
where the directors have an inherent interest in high remuneration and are
more concerned with creating their own wealth, and less concerned with the
performance and the interests of company stakeholders. Increased scrutiny
may thus force executive directors to accept reasonable and fair remunera-
tion.30
By contrast, some reasons advocated against full remuneration disclosure
of directors are that disclosure leads to deprivation of the privacy of directors;
it may be costly to the company; and the availability of information on the
level of the remuneration paid in other companies may lead to the ratcheting
of payments.31 Ratcheting occurs when boards of directors simply seek to
pay their directors more than the industry average, regardless of whether or
not the directors deserve such levels of remuneration.32 It has been
contended that directors who are paid below the prevailing industry average
are more likely to advocate for an increase in their salaries.33 By contrast, the
directors who are paid above the prevailing industry average are less likely to
get a reduction in their salaries.34 This is so because the remuneration
committees must ensure that the company’s senior executives are paid the
prevailing industry rate or more in order to retain them.35 This practice has
the tendency to distort the industry average,36 since a company that does not
26 Ferrarini &Moloney op cit note 11 at 311.
27 Luiz op cit note 23 at 65; Ferrarini & Moloney ibid; Sheehan op cit note 20 at
292; Hill op cit note 10 at 237.
28 Hill ibid at 237–8.
29 Ibid at 237.
30 Ibid.
31 Ferrarini &Moloney op cit note 11 at 312.
32 Bebchuk& Fried op cit note 14 at 129.
33 Ezzamel &Watson op cit note 14 at 221–3.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Bebchuk& Fried op cit note 14 at 129.
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pay the prevailing industry rate is likely to face recruitment, motivational and
retention challenges.37
However, we believe that public policy considerations in favour of the
disclosure of the remuneration of directors which have been discussed above,
such as the prevention of self-dealing and prevention of conﬂict of interest in
the remuneration-setting process, far outweigh the privacy considerations.38
Further, we believe that transparency will contribute to more accountability
and openness in the remuneration-setting process. Moreover, effective
disclosure of the remuneration of directors by companies is not only in the
public interest, but it also concerns information which shareholders and
prospective investors are entitled to know.39 Accordingly, we argue that
there exist far stronger reasons to disclose the remuneration of directors than
not to disclose it.
IV SOUTH AFRICA’S REMUNERATION-DISCLOSURE
REGIME
In South Africa the disclosure of directors’ remuneration is regulated by
s 30(4) of the Companies Act. In addition, the JSE Listings Requirements
and the King IV Report contain important provisions regarding the
remuneration of directors and the disclosure of directors’ remuneration.
(a) The meaning of ‘remuneration’
The term ‘remuneration’ is not deﬁned in s 1 of the Companies Act. The
Companies Act deﬁnes ‘remuneration’ in s 30(6) only in regard to the
disclosure of information in the annual ﬁnancial statements of a company that
is required by the Companies Act to have its annual ﬁnancial statements
audited.40 Apart from this deﬁnition, the precise meaning of ‘remuneration’
in the Companies Act is not clear. For example, it is not clear whether
‘remuneration’ in the Companies Act encompasses only payments in cash or
whether it encompasses other beneﬁts as well. It is also not clear what
‘remuneration’ in s 66(8) of the Companies Act means, and whether the
phrase ‘service as directors’ in s 66(8) of the same Act refers only to
remuneration to directors for their services as directors (such as attending
board meetings) or whether the phrase includes remuneration paid to
executive directors in terms of their employment contracts (such as salaries
and bonuses).41This is discussed further below.
37 Ezzamel &Watson op cit note 14 at 230.
38 See also DavidAblen ‘Remunerating ‘‘fairly and responsibly’’—The ‘‘principle
of good corporate governance and best practice recommendations’’ of the ASX Cor-
porate Governance Council’ (2003) 25 Sydney LR 555 at 565.
39 SeeHill op cit note 10 at 241;Ablen ibid at 565.
40 This is discussed further in part IV(b) below. See also s 30(4) and (5) of the
CompaniesAct.
41 See Farouk H I Cassim, Maleka Femida Cassim, Rehana Cassim et al Contempo-
rary Company Law 2 ed (2012) 455–6.
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In contrast, s 226A(1) of the UK Companies Act, 200642 clearly deﬁnes
the term ‘remuneration’ as follows:
‘[A]ny form of payment or other beneﬁt made to or otherwise conferred on a
person as consideration for the person—
(a) holding, agreeing to hold or having held ofﬁce as director of a company,
or
(b) holding, agreeing to hold or having held, during a period when the person
is or was such a director—
(i) any other ofﬁce or employment in connection with the management
of the affairs of the company, or
(ii) any ofﬁce (as director or otherwise) or employment in connection
with the management of the affairs of any subsidiary undertaking of
the company, other than a payment for loss of ofﬁce.’43
It is clear from the words ‘any form of payment or other beneﬁt’ in the
above deﬁnition that remuneration payments in the UK Companies Act,
2006 encompass both payments in cash, as well as beneﬁts other than in cash.
(b) Remuneration disclosure under the Companies Act
Section 30(4) of the Companies Act requires extensive disclosure of
information in relation to the remuneration of directors in the annual
ﬁnancial statements. It is, however, important to specify the identity of the
companies that are required to comply with the disclosure requirements of
s 30(4). This is because not all companies are required to comply with s 30(4)
of the Companies Act. Companies that are required to disclose the remuner-
ation of directors in their annual ﬁnancial statements are companies that are
42 Section 226A is contained in chap 4A of part 10 of the UK Companies Act,
2006, which deals with directors of quoted companies. This chapter was inserted by
s 80 of the Enterprise andRegulatoryReformAct, 2013.
43 Section 215 of the UK Companies Act, 2006 (contained in chap 4 of part 10
which deals with transactions with directors requiring approval of members) provides
a comprehensive deﬁnition of ‘payment for loss of ofﬁce’. It deﬁnes ‘payment for loss
of ofﬁce’ to mean: ‘a payment made to a director or past director of a company —
(a) by way of compensation for loss of ofﬁce as director of the company; (b) by way of
compensation for loss, while director of the company or in connection with his
ceasing to be a director of it, of — (i) any other ofﬁce or employment in connection
with the management of the affairs of the company, or (ii) any ofﬁce (as director or
otherwise) or employment in connection with the management of the affairs of any
subsidiary undertaking of the company; (c) as consideration for or in connection with
his retirement from his ofﬁce as director of the company; or (d) as consideration for or
in connection with his retirement, while director of the company or in connection
with his ceasing to be a director of it, from — (i) any other ofﬁce or employment in
connection with the management of the affairs of the company, or (ii) any ofﬁce (as
director or otherwise) or employment in connection with the management of the
affairs of any subsidiary undertaking of the company.’ Section 215(2) expressly states
that the references to compensation and consideration include beneﬁts otherwise
than in cash.
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required in terms of the Companies Act to have their annual ﬁnancial
statements audited.44
In terms of s 30(2)(a) of the CompaniesAct the annual ﬁnancial statements
of a public company must be audited. In the case of any other proﬁt or
non-proﬁt company, the annual ﬁnancial statements must be audited if so
required by the regulations made by the Minister in terms of s 30(7), taking
into account whether it is desirable in the public interest, having regard to the
economic or social signiﬁcance of the company, as indicated by any relevant
factors, including its annual turnover, the size of its workforce, or the nature
and extent of its activities.45 In terms of reg 28(2) of the Companies
Regulations, 2011, in addition to public companies and state-owned
companies, any company that falls into the following categories in any
ﬁnancial year must have its annual ﬁnancial statements for that ﬁnancial year
audited:
• Any proﬁt or non-proﬁt company if, in the ordinary course of its primary
activities, it holds assets in a ﬁduciary capacity for persons who are not
related to the company and the aggregate value of such assets held at any
time during the ﬁnancial year exceeds R5million.46
• Any non-proﬁt company if (i) it was incorporated directly or indirectly
by the state, an organ of state, a state-owned company, an international
entity, a foreign state entity or a foreign company; or (ii) it was
incorporated primarily to perform a statutory or regulatory function in
terms of any legislation, or to carry out a public function at the direct or
indirect initiation or direction of an organ of the state, a state-owned
company, an international entity, or a foreign state entity, or for a purpose
ancillary to any such function.47
• Any other company whose public interest score48 in that ﬁnancial year is
350 or more, or is at least 100, if its annual ﬁnancial statements were
internally compiled.49
It must be noted that the annual ﬁnancial statements of a proﬁt company
or non-proﬁt company must be audited voluntarily if its Memorandum of
44 Section 30(4) of the CompaniesAct.
45 Section 30(2)(b)(i) of the CompaniesAct.
46 Regulation 28(2)(a).
47 Regulation 28(2)(b).
48 Refer to reg 26(2) of the Companies Regulations, 2011 for details on how the
public interest score is to be calculated.
49 Regulation 28(2)(c). Section 30(2A) of the Companies Act exempts companies
from having their annual ﬁnancial statements audited or independently reviewed in
instances where every person who is a holder of or has a beneﬁcial interest in any
securities issued by that company, is also a director of the company. However this
exemption does not apply to the company if it falls into a class of company that is
required to have its annual ﬁnancial statements audited in terms of the Companies
Regulations, 2011. The exemption also does not relieve the company of any require-
ment to have its ﬁnancial statements audited or reviewed in terms of another law, or
in terms of any agreement to which the company is a party.
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Incorporation or a shareholders’ resolution or directors’ resolution requires
this to be done.50
In terms of s 30(4)(a) the annual ﬁnancial statements of a company that is
required in terms of the Companies Act to be audited must disclose the
remuneration and beneﬁts received by each director or prescribed ofﬁcer in
the company. Remuneration, as deﬁned in s 30(6) of the Companies Act, for
purposes of s 30(4) and (5) of the CompaniesAct, includes:
• the fees paid to a director for services rendered to or on behalf of the
company, including an amount paid to a person for accepting the ofﬁce
of director;
• salary, bonuses and performance-related payments;
• expense allowances to the extent that the director is not required to
account for the allowance;
• pension scheme contributions not otherwise required to be disclosed in
terms of s 30(4)(b);
• the value of any option or right given directly or indirectly to a past,
current or future director or a person related to any of them (as
contemplated in s 42 of the CompaniesAct);
• ﬁnancial assistance provided to a past, present or future director or to a
person related to any of them, for the subscription of options or
securities, or the purchase of securities, as contemplated in s 44 of the
CompaniesAct; and
• with respect to any loan or other ﬁnancial assistance by the company to a
past, present or future director or a person related to any of them, or any
loan made by a third party to any such person as contemplated in s 45 of
the CompaniesAct if the company is a guarantor of that loan, the value of
any deferred, waived or forgiven interest, or the difference in value
between the interest that would reasonably be charged in comparable
circumstances at fair market rate in an arm’s length transaction and the
interest actually charged to the borrower if it is less.
Further, in terms of s 30(4)(b) of the Companies Act, the annual ﬁnancial
statements must include the following information with regard to current or
past directors or prescribed ofﬁcers:
• the amount of any pensions paid by the company;
• any amount paid or payable by the company to a pension scheme;
• compensation for loss of ofﬁce;
• any securities issued and the consideration received by the company for
those securities; and
• the details of service contracts.
In addition, s 30(5) requires that the annual ﬁnancial statements disclose
the amount of any remuneration and beneﬁts paid to or receivable by persons
in respect of services rendered as directors or prescribed ofﬁcers of the
50 See s 30(2)(b)(ii)(aa) of the CompaniesAct.
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company, or services rendered while being directors or prescribed ofﬁcers of
the company as (i) directors or prescribed ofﬁcers of any other company
within the same group of companies; or (ii) otherwise in connection with the
carrying on of the affairs of the company or any other company within the
same group of companies.
It is clear from the above deﬁnition that s 30(4) of the CompaniesAct, read
in conjunction with subsecs (5) and (6), has emphasised the individualised
disclosure of various components of directors’ remuneration, including ﬁxed
and variable components of the remuneration package. This separate
disclosure of the nature and extent of various component parts of each
director’s remuneration package is an improvement on s 297 of the Compa-
nies Act 61 of 1973, which required the ﬁnancial statements merely to
disclose the amount of the emoluments received by directors as an aggre-
gate.51
(c) The King IV Report
The King IV Report was published on 1 November 2016 and replaced its
predecessor, the King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa,
2009 (‘the King III Report’).52Notably, the King IVReport has replaced the
‘apply or explain’ application regime of the King III Report with an ‘apply
and explain’ application regime.53 This means that companies and other
organisations should apply the principles of the King IV Report and explain
how the principles are being effected.54 The application or adoption of the
principles of the King IV Report is, therefore, assumed.55 The explanation
that is required is a narrative account of how the recommended practices
have been implemented.56
The King IV Report contains signiﬁcant improvements on remuneration
disclosure and the format of such disclosure when compared to the King III
Report.57 It recommends that remuneration should be disclosed in three
parts, namely (i) a background statement setting out the context for
remuneration considerations and decisions; (ii) an overview of the main
provisions of the remuneration policy; and (iii) an implementation report
51 See s 297(1A)(a) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. The other components that
had to be disclosed in terms of s 297 were the amount of the pensions paid or receiv-
able by directors and past directors, the amount of any compensation paid to directors
and past directors in respect of loss of ofﬁce, and details of directors’ service contracts.
Refer to s 297(1)(b)–(d) of the CompaniesAct 61 of 1973.
52 Disclosure on the application of the King IVReport is effective in respect of the
ﬁnancial years beginning on or after 1April 2017. See the King IVReport at 38.
53 King IVReport at 37.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Principle 2.26 of the King III Report simply recommended that each company
should disclose the remuneration of each individual executive and non-executive
director in its annual remuneration report, which was to be contained in the inte-
grated report.
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which contains details of all the remuneration awarded to each executive
director during the reporting period.58
Principle 2.25 of the King III Report recommended that companies
should remunerate directors and executives fairly and responsibly. Principle
14 of the King IV Report goes further than the King III Report in this
regard, since it recommends that the board should ensure that the company
remunerates not only ‘fairly’ and ‘responsibly’, but also ‘transparently’, in
order to promote the achievement of strategic objectives and positive
outcomes in the short, medium and long term. Importantly, the King IV
Report places emphasis on transparency.
Principle 14 of the King IV Report contains detailed recommended
practices on the remuneration policy. It recommends that the board should
approve a policy that articulates and gives effect to its direction on fair,
responsible and transparent remuneration.59The remuneration policy should
be designed to attract, motivate, reward and retain human capital and
promote the achievement of strategic objectives within the organisation’s
risk appetite.60 It should also promote an ethical culture and responsible
corporate citizenship.61 The board should oversee that the implementation
of the remuneration policy achieves the objectives of the policy.62
The King IV Report recommends further that the remuneration policy
for executive directors and prescribed ofﬁcers should be fair and responsible
in the context of overall employee remuneration in the organisation.63 The
remuneration policy should further address all components of remunera-
tion.64This includes base salary, ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial beneﬁts, variable
remuneration, and the fees of non-executive directors.65
(d) The JSE Listings Requirements
The JSE Listings Requirements speciﬁes certain disclosure requirements
regarding directors’ remuneration with which listed companies must comply.
Paragraph 8.63(k) of the JSE Listings Requirements requires listed companies
to disclose in the annual ﬁnancial statements each director’s remuneration
and beneﬁts for the current and preceding ﬁnancial year.66The remuneration
and beneﬁts payable to those directors who have resigned during the
reporting period must also be disclosed.67
58 King IVReport 65 paras 32–5.
59 King IVReport 64 para 27.
60 King IVReport 65 para 28a–b.
61 Ibid para 28d.
62 Ibid para 31.
63 Ibid para 29a.
64 Ibid para 30.
65 Ibid.
66 The requirements in para 8.63(k) of the JSE Listings Requirements are in addi-
tion to complying with International Financial Reporting Standards and s 30 of the
CompaniesAct.
67 Paragraph 8.63(k) of the JSE Listings Requirements.
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In terms of para 8.63(k) of the JSE Listings Requirements, read with para
7.B.7, the following information must be disclosed in the annual ﬁnancial
statements:
• fees for services as a director;
• management, consulting, technical or other fees paid for such services
rendered;
• basic salary;
• bonuses and performance-related payments;
• sums paid by way of expense allowance;
• any other material beneﬁts received, with an explanation as to what this
includes;
• contributions to pension schemes;
• any commission, gain or proﬁt-sharing arrangements; and
• details in respect of share options or any other right given which has had
the same or a similar effect in respect of providing a right to subscribe for
shares.
It is important to note that para 8.63(a) of the JSE Listings Requirements
requires each listed company to disclose a narrative statement in its annual
report of how it has applied the principles set out in the King III Report,
providing an explanation that enables its shareholders to evaluate how it has
applied the principles.68 The company must also disclose a statement
addressing the extent of its application of the principles of the King III
Report, and the reasons for each and every instance of non-application
during the accounting period. The company must explain whether or not it
has complied throughout the accounting period with all the provisions of the
King III Report, and must indicate for what part of the period any
non-compliance occurred. In this way, the JSE Listings Requirements have
expressly adopted the recommendations of the King III Report, and have
made them applicable to all companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock
Exchange.69
68 The JSE Listings Requirements still refer to the previous King III Code, which
has now been replaced by the King IV Report. The JSE has, however, proposed
amendments to para 8.63 of the JSE Listings Requirements to incorporate a reference
to the King IV Report. These amendments are expected to be implemented during
the course of 2017. See the proposedAmendments to the JSE Listings Requirements
of 1November 2016.
69 If a company whose securities are listed on the JSE has contravened or failed to
comply with the provisions of the JSE Listings Requirements, the JSE has a discretion
to impose a variety of penalties on such company. For instance, the JSE may censure
the company and its directors; impose a ﬁne on the company and its directors; sus-
pend the listing of the securities of the company; or remove the listing of any securi-
ties of the company. The JSE may further make a public announcement that it has
taken the above steps against the company. See paras 1.6–1.8, 1.11–1.12, 1.20–1.24
and 1.27 of the JSE Listings Requirements. These potential penalties would exert
strong pressure on listed companies to comply with the provisions of the JSE Listings
Requirements.
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It is, therefore, noteworthy that if the JSE adopts the recommendations of
the King IVReport in its Listings Requirements (as it has done with the King
III Report) these recommendations will be binding on companies listed on
the JSE.
V A COMPARISON BETWEEN SOUTHAFRICA’S
REMUNERATION-DISCLOSURE REGIME AND THAT OF
THE UK
Disclosure of directors’ remuneration in the UK is regulated by the UK
CompaniesAct, 2006, the Enterprise and Regulatory ReformAct, 2013, and
the Large and Medium-sized Companies and Groups (Accounts and
Reports) (Amendment) Regulations, 2013 (hereafter referred to as ‘the 2013
Regulations’).70 The Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act, 2013 contains
signiﬁcant amendments to the UK Companies Act, 2006 in regard to
payments to directors of quoted companies.71 Quoted companies, as deﬁned
by s 385(2) of the Companies Act, 2006, mean companies whose equity
share capital has been included in the Ofﬁcial List in accordance with part 6
of the Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000,72 or is ofﬁcially listed in a
European Economic Area state, or is admitted to dealing on either the New
York Stock Exchange or Nasdaq.
In addition, UK-listed companies must comply with the relevant provi-
sions of the Corporate Governance Code or explain their reasons for
non-compliance, and they must also comply with the Listing Rules require-
ments relating to remuneration of directors. This part will discuss the relevant
features of the UK legislation with speciﬁc focus on the UK Companies Act,
2006, the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act, 2013 and the 2013
Regulations. Notably, the provisions discussed below regulating the disclo-
sure of directors’ remuneration in the UK are only applicable to quoted
companies, as deﬁned in the legislation.
(a) A three-part remuneration report
Section 420(1) of the UK Companies Act, 2006 requires companies to
prepare a directors’ remuneration report for each ﬁnancial year of the
company, which must be approved by the board of directors and signed by a
director or company secretary.73 The speciﬁc contents of the directors’
70 The 2013 Regulations came into force on 1 October 2013 and have replaced
the Large andMedium-sized Companies and Groups (Accounts and Reports) Regu-
lations, 2008.
71 See ss 79–82 of the Enterprise andRegulatoryReformAct, 2013.
72 The ‘Ofﬁcial List’ refers to the Financial Conduct Authority’s (‘FCA’) list of
securities that have been admitted to listing. The FCAmust maintain the Ofﬁcial List
in accordance with part 6 of the Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000 (see
s 103(1)).
73 See s 422(1) of theUKCompaniesAct, 2006.
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remuneration report are prescribed in the 2013 Regulations.74The directors’
remuneration report for a UK-quoted company must be divided into three
parts, namely a statement by the remuneration committee chairperson,75 a
separate directors’ remuneration policy,76 and an annual directors’ remunera-
tion report.77 The requirement of a three-part remuneration report is one
method of increasing transparency in the UK by ensuring that the remunera-
tion report is easy to read and understand. In contrast, the South African
Companies Act does not provide for a similar requirement. As discussed
above, the King IV Report contains a recommendation for a three-part
remuneration report.78 This is a positive step because it will enhance
transparency and accountability in the remuneration of directors in those
companies which adopt such recommendations.
(b) A statement by the remuneration committee chair
With effect from 1 October 2013, the directors’ remuneration report for a
UK-quoted company must comprise a statement by the remuneration
committee chairperson as required by reg 3 of the 2013 Regulations.79 The
statement by the chair of the remuneration committee must summarise for
the relevant ﬁnancial year the major decisions on directors’ remuneration,
any substantial changes relating to directors’ remuneration made during the
year, and the context in which those changes occurred and why those
decisions have been taken.80 The signiﬁcance of the requirement of a
statement by the chair of the remuneration committee is that it ensures direct
communication between the remuneration committee chair and the compa-
ny’s shareholders and other stakeholders.
In contrast, the SouthAfrican CompaniesAct does not make provision for
a similar requirement. The JSE Listings Requirements are also silent on this
issue. It is of interest that the King IV Report recommends that the
remuneration report should comprise a background statement.81 In terms
of the King IV Report, the background statement should brieﬂy provide
context for remuneration considerations and decisions.82 It should refer to
factors that inﬂuenced remuneration; the most recent results of the voting on
the remuneration policy and the implementation report and the measures
74 The regulations made under s 421 of the UK Companies Act, 2006 must pre-
scribe the information that must be contained in a directors’ remuneration report,
how the information is to be set out in the report and what the auditable part of the
report will be.
75 See part 2 of the 2013Regulations.
76 See part 4 of the 2013Regulations.
77 See part 3 of the 2013Regulations.
78 King IVReport 65 para 32.
79 Where there is no remuneration committee chair, the statement must be made
by a director nominated by the directors to make the statement. See reg 3 of the 2013
Regulations.
80 See reg 3(a)–(c) of the 2013Regulations.
81 King IVReport 65 para 32.
82 King IVReport 66 para 33.
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taken in response thereto; the remuneration committee’s key focus areas and
any substantial amendments to the policy; whether remuneration consultants
were used; the remuneration committee’s views on whether the implemen-
tation of the remuneration policy achieved its stated objectives, as well as
future areas of focus.83 Although the background statement is similar to the
statement by the chair of the remuneration committee in the UK, the
King IV Report is more advanced in this regard because it also requires
disclosure of whether the implementation of the remuneration policy
achieved its objectives. The background statement is forward looking in so
far as it must indicate future areas of focus.
(c) A separate directors’ remuneration policy
A director’s remuneration policy refers to guidelines that determine the
company’s approach to all aspects of directors’ remuneration for the year
going forward.84The UK Companies Act, 2006 speciﬁcally requires compa-
nies to disclose a directors’ remuneration policy separately, and the content
and format of such a policy is set out in part 4 of the 2013 Regulations.85The
directors’ remuneration policy, in terms of the 2013 Regulations, must
address the issues set out in sub-subheadings (i)–(vi) below.
(i) A description of the components of the remuneration package
In terms of reg 25 of the 2013 Regulations, the directors’ remuneration
policy must provide, in tabular form, a clear description of each of the
component parts of the remuneration package. The component parts of the
directors’ remuneration package include the total amount of salary and fees,
all taxable beneﬁts, performance-related payments and awards as well as all
pension-related beneﬁts.86 The table must further include any particular
arrangements which are speciﬁc to any director individually.87
(ii) The link between remuneration and company strategy
Regulation 26(a) of the 2013 Regulations requires the directors’ remunera-
tion policy to provide an explanation as to how each component of the
remuneration package supports the company’s short and long-term strategic
objectives. Regulation 26(d) contains stringent requirements for a detailed
disclosure of the framework used to assess performance, including the
performance measures applied and, where more than one performance
measure applies, an indication of the weighting of the performance measure
83 Ibid.
84 See regs 25–40 of the 2013Regulations.
85 Section 421(2A) of the UK Companies Act, 2006 provides that the regulations
must provide that any information required to be included in the report as to the
policy of the company with respect to the making of remuneration payments and
payments for loss of ofﬁce be set out in a separate part of the report.
86 Regulation 25 read with part 3 of the 2013Regulations.
87 Ibid.
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or group-of-performance measures.88 An accompanying explanation for
choosing the particular performance measures and methods of assessing
performance must be provided in accordance with reg 27 of the 2013
Regulations.89 There must also be a clear illustration, in the form of a bar
chart, of the level of remuneration that would be received by each of the
directors (other than a director who is not performing an executive function)
in accordance with the directors’ remuneration policy in the ﬁrst year to
which the policy applies.90 These disclosure requirements help to focus the
company’s attention on the link between remuneration and the company’s
strategy. They also compel quoted companies to consider the sensitivities
between remuneration and performance.
(iii) Employee engagement
Regulation 38 read with reg 39 of the 2013 Regulations requires each UK-
quoted company to provide an explanation of how the pay and employment
conditions of the company’s employees (other than directors) were consid-
ered when setting the policy for directors’ remuneration, including whether
(and if so, how) the company consulted with employees, and whether any
remuneration comparison measurements were used. An explanation of any
differences in the company’s policy on the remuneration of directors from
the policy on the remuneration of the company’s employees must be
provided in accordance with reg 27(e) of the 2013 Regulations. These
disclosure requirements compel each UK-quoted company to consider the
fairness between the remuneration of the directors and the employees of the
company. Companies will have to consider the issue of the widening gap
between the earnings of their directors and that of their employees.
Employee engagement will thus become one of the priorities for company
boards in the UK.
88 Regulation 26 of the 2013Regulations further requires that the directors’ remu-
neration policy provide an explanation as to how each component of the remunera-
tion package operates; the maximum that may be paid in respect of that component;
a description of the framework used to assess performance, including a description of
any performance measures which apply; the weighting of the performance measures;
details of any performance period; the amount that may be paid in respect of the
minimum level of performance that results in any payment under the policy, and any
further levels of performance set in accordance with the policy. It must also provide
an explanation as to whether there are any provisions for the recovery of sums paid or
the withholding of the payment of any sum.
89 In terms of reg 27 of the 2013 Regulations the remuneration policy must con-
tain an explanation of why any performance measures were chosen and how any
performance targets are set. In respect of any component (other than salary, fees,
beneﬁts or pension) which is not subject to performance measures, an explanation
must be provided as to why there are no such measures. If any component did not
form part of the remuneration package in the previous approved directors’ remunera-
tion policy, there must be an explanation as to why that component is now contained
in the remuneration package.
90 Regulations 33–5 of the 2013Regulations.
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(iv) Recruitment, service contracts and termination payments
In terms of reg 29 of the 2013 Regulations, the directors’ remuneration
policy must indicate the company’s approach to recruitment remuneration,
and must contain a statement of the principles which would be applied by the
company when agreeing on the components of a remuneration package for
the appointment of directors, as well as the maximum level of variable
remuneration which may be granted. The remuneration policy must also
disclose the company’s approach on the setting of notice periods under
directors’ service contracts, and the principles on which the determination of
payments for loss of ofﬁce will be approached, including the calculation of
each component of the payment and an explanation of whether the
circumstances of the director’s loss of ofﬁce and performance during the
period of service will be relevant to the calculation of the termination
payment.91 These requirements help to focus the board’s attention more
closely on the often problematic termination arrangements and golden
parachutes sometimes given to directors.
(v) Shareholder participation in regard to the remuneration policy
In terms of reg 40 of the 2013 Regulations, the directors’ remuneration
policy must indicate whether any views expressed by the shareholders to the
company were taken into account in the formulation of the directors’
remuneration policy. This compels companies to take shareholder engage-
ment on remuneration matters seriously.
Section 439A, read with s 421(2A) of the UK Companies Act, 2006,
further requires a quoted company to put the directors’ remuneration policy
to a binding shareholder resolution at an accounts meeting held in the ﬁrst
ﬁnancial year on which the company becomes a quoted company.92
Thereafter, the directors’ future remuneration policy must be put to a
shareholder vote every three years at an accounts meeting or other general
meeting which is not the accounts meeting.93 These requirements exert
strong pressure on companies to take shareholders’ concerns into account and
to review any objectionable provisions in the remuneration policy.
(vi) A revised directors’ remuneration policy
A directors’ remuneration policy may be revised in accordance with s 422A
of the UK Companies Act, 2006.94 This means that the remuneration policy
may be amended or updated. The revised policy must address all the matters
set out in sub-paras (i)–(v) above, and must be set out in the same manner, as
91 Regulations 36–7 of the 2013Regulations.
92 In terms of s 439A(8) of the UK Companies Act, 2006 ‘accounts meeting’ refers
to a general meeting of the company, before which the company’s annual accounts
for a ﬁnancial year are to be laid.
93 Section 439A(1)(b) of the UK Companies Act, 2006 inserted by s 79(4) of the
Enterprise andRegulatoryReformAct, 2013.
94 This provision was inserted by s 79(2) of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform
Act, 2013.
(2017) 134 THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL400
© Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd
required by the Regulations with regard to the directors’ remuneration
policy.95 It must also be approved by the board of directors in terms of
s 422A(2) of the UKCompaniesAct, 2006.96These provisions relating to the
revision of a company’s remuneration policy allow for ﬂexibility to make
changes to the policy in between the annual general meetings, should the
need arise.
Notably, there is no requirement for a remuneration policy in the South
African Companies Act. This is a grave omission, since greater transparency
in relation to the remuneration policy provides shareholders and other
company stakeholders with insight into how the remuneration of directors is
structured and determined. This empowers shareholders and stakeholders to
assess whether the remuneration policy formulated by the company is sound,
as well as to hold the directors accountable on the basis of the remuneration
policy.
The King IV Report has introduced an approach which is similar to that
adopted in the UK in that it provides for the adoption of a separate
remuneration policy and the disclosure of an overview of its main provisions.
According to the King IV Report, such an overview should set out the
remuneration elements and design principles for determining the remunera-
tion of directors.97 The remuneration policy should include the details of
obligations in executive employment contracts which could give rise to
payments on termination of employment or ofﬁce.98 To ensure fairness
between the remuneration of executive directors and the remuneration of
the rest of the company’s employees, the King IV Report recommends that
the remuneration policy should disclose an explanation of how the policy
addresses fair and responsible remuneration for executive management in the
context of overall employee remuneration.99 The remuneration policy
should also disclose the basis for the determination of non-executive
directors’ fees, and the use and justiﬁcation of remuneration benchmarks.100
A reference to an electronic link to the full remuneration policy should be
provided for public access.101 This would allow company stakeholders to
access and scrutinise the full remuneration report.
Although the recommendations of the King IV Report on the disclosure
of a remuneration policy are an improvement on its predecessor, the King III
Report, and are in line with the provisions of the 2013 Regulations in the
UK, they are non-binding on non-listed entities. Poor implementation of
these recommendations would make effective shareholder and stakeholder
assessment of the underlying drivers of individual remuneration packages
95 See part 4 of sched 8 of the 2013Regulations.
96 Section 422A(2) of the UK Companies Act, 2006 was inserted by s 79(2) of the
Enterprise andRegulatoryReformAct, 2013.
97 King IVReport 66 para 34a.
98 Ibid para 34b.
99 Ibid para 34e.
100 Ibid para 34f–g.
101 Ibid para 34h.
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extremely difﬁcult. Moreover, the shareholder vote on the adoption of the
remuneration policy under the King IV Report is merely a non-binding
advisory vote, as we discuss below.102
(d) An annual directors’ remuneration report
An annual directors’ remuneration report, also known as the implementation
report, is a detailed description of how the approved remuneration policy
was implemented in the relevant ﬁnancial year and in the previous ﬁnancial
year.103 This sub-part discusses the salient features of an annual directors’
remuneration report in terms of the UK Companies Act, 2006, whilst
making comparisons with the South African Companies Act. Under the UK
Companies Act, 2006 the directors’ remuneration report must address the
issues set out in sub-subheadings (i)–(vii) below.
(i) Disclosure of various components of directors’ remuneration
An annual directors’ remuneration report must contain a single total ﬁgure
table setting out, for the relevant ﬁnancial year and for each director:
• the total amount of salary and fees;
• all taxable beneﬁts;
• performance related payments and awards;
• all pension related beneﬁts; and
• the total amount of the sums set out above.104
Disclosure of the above information must also be made in respect of the
ﬁnancial year preceding the relevant ﬁnancial year in a manner that will allow
comparisons between the two ﬁnancial years.105 Further, an annual directors’
implementation report must, for the relevant ﬁnancial year, give details of
inter alia any payments to past directors,106 payments for loss of ofﬁce,107 as
well as directors’ shareholdings and share interests.108
These requirements (speciﬁcally for individualised disclosure of various
components of directors’ remuneration in the UK, including ﬁxed and
variable components of the remuneration package) are similar to the
requirements of s 30(4) of the South African Companies Act. Separate
102 Notably, the JSE has proposed that there be a mandatory non-binding advisory
vote for both the remuneration policy and the remuneration implementation report.
See the proposed Amendments to the JSE Listings Requirements of 1 November
2016.
103 See part 3 of the 2013Regulations.
104 Ibid.
105 Regulation 9 of the 2013Regulations.
106 Regulation 15 of the 2013Regulations.
107 Regulation 16 of the 2013 Regulations. Payments for loss of ofﬁce must be
broken down into their individual components, and an explanation of how each
component was calculatedmust be provided.
108 Regulation 17 of the 2013 Regulations. According to this section the require-
ments or guidelines for directors to own shares in the company must be disclosed, as
well as whether those guidelines or requirements have beenmet.
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disclosure of the individual components of the remuneration package rather
than on an aggregate basis assists company stakeholders to assess whether the
composition of the package has been carefully structured, with an appropri-
ate balance between ﬁxed remuneration, short-term elements and long-term
elements. It may also be used as a comparative tool amongst comparable
companies. Extensive and focused disclosure in this regard makes effective
remuneration monitoring possible, since it may expose certain weaknesses in
the remuneration structure.
Although the provisions relating to the disclosure of a separate annual
directors’ remuneration report in the UK are comparable to s 30(4) read with
subsecs (5) and (6) of the South African Companies Act, it should be noted
that the Companies Act does not go as far as the UK Companies Act, 2006.
The latter appears to be more advanced than the former, as will be detailed
under sub-subheadings (ii)–(vii).
(ii) Percentage change in remuneration of the chief executive officer
An annual directors’ remuneration report must set out the percentage change
in the remuneration of the director who performs the role of the chief
executive ofﬁcer (‘CEO’) and an average percentage change of all the other
employees of the company or group in accordance with reg 19 of the 2013
Regulations. This requirement compels the board and remuneration com-
mittees to ensure that the pay increases of the CEO are in line with those of
the rest of the employees. In contrast, the SouthAfrican Companies Act does
not have a similar provision. There is no equivalent provision either in the
JSE ListingsRequirements, or in the recommendations of theKing IVReport.
(iii) The relative importance of spend on pay
Regulation 20 of the 2013 Regulations requires an annual directors’
remuneration report to set out in a graphical or tabular form, in respect of the
relevant ﬁnancial year and the immediately preceding ﬁnancial year, the
actual expenditure of the company and the difference in spend between
those years on the remuneration of employees, shareholder distributions and
any other signiﬁcant distributions and payments.109 This compels companies
to reveal how much they spent on directors’ remuneration in relation to
other important payments. There is no equivalent provision in the South
African Companies Act. The JSE Listings Requirements and the King IV
Report are also silent on this issue.
(iv) The link between remuneration and performance
Regulation 12(2) of the 2013 Regulations requires companies to set out,
with respect to performance-related payments and awards, the details of each
of the performance measures, including their weightings and performance
109 In respect of any other signiﬁcant distributions and payments or other use of
proﬁts, an explanation must be given as to why the particular matters were chosen by
the directors, and how the amounts were calculated. See reg 20(2)–(3) of the 2013
Regulations.
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targets. The details of actual performance relative to the targets set and
measured over the reporting period, details concerning any discretion
exercised in respect of an award and the resulting levels of awards or
payments must also be disclosed.110An annual directors’ remuneration report
must also show a correlation between the company’s performance and the
CEO’s remuneration over a speciﬁed period of ﬁnancial years.111 These
provisions ensure greater transparency in relation to the link between
remuneration and performance in the implementation report.
On the other hand, s 30(4) of the SouthAfrican CompaniesAct has merely
focused on disclosure of the types of remuneration, and has overlooked the
issues of the quality of the disclosure. This section does not go as far as reg 12
of the 2013 Regulations, which requires UK-quoted companies to disclose
the performance conditions for the directors, how the directors performed
against those conditions, and the resulting levels of remuneration. Disclosure
of such information will assist to assess the appropriateness of the key
performance criteria applied, as well as to establish the link between
remuneration and performance.
The King III Report recommended that companies in SouthAfrica should
provide an explanation of the basis on which remuneration is measured. The
King IV Report goes further than the King III Report in this regard, and
recommends that companies should disclose the use of performance mea-
sures that support positive outcomes across the economic, social and
environmental context in which the organisation operates.112 However, as
discussed earlier, the recommendations of the King IV Report are not
binding, save in respect of listed companies.
(v) Statement of implementation of remuneration policy in the following financial
year
Regulation 21 of the 2013 Regulations provides that an annual directors’
remuneration report must contain a statement describing how the company
intends to implement the approved directors’ remuneration policy in the
following ﬁnancial year, including any signiﬁcant changes to be made to the
policy in the following ﬁnancial year compared to how it was implemented
in the relevant ﬁnancial year.113 The idea is to manage expectations. There is
no equivalent provision in the South African Companies Act. It is of interest
that the King IVReport recommends that future remuneration areas of focus
should be disclosed in the background statement of the remuneration
report,114 and not in the annual directors’ report, as is the case in the UK.
110 Regulation 12(2) and (3) of the 2013Regulations.
111 See, for example, reg 18(2) of the 2013Regulations.
112 King IVReport 65 para 29b.
113 Regulation 21 of the 2013 Regulations. The statement should also disclose the
performance measures, their relative weightings and the performance targets deter-
mined for the performancemeasures, as well as how awards will be calculated.
114 King IVReport 66 para 33f.
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(vi) Transparency in the decision-making process
In the UK, an annual directors’ remuneration report must provide informa-
tion on the names of each director who is a member of the company’s board
committee that has considered matters relating to the directors’ remuneration
(this is usually the remuneration committee).115 It must also state whether
any person provided advice or services that materially assisted the committee
in its consideration of any matter relating to the directors’ remuneration.116
In the case of such a person, an annual directors’ remuneration report must
disclose the nature of any other services provided by that person to the
company during the relevant ﬁnancial year.117 It must further provide
information relating to the selection and appointment of that person,118 state
whether and how the remuneration committee has satisﬁed itself that the
advice received was objective and independent,119 and state the amount of
the fees or charges paid by the company to that person for the advice or
services provided, and the basis on which it was charged.120 These require-
ments compel companies to focus on transparency in the decision-making
process used for determining the directors’ remuneration, with a focus
on board committees and external consultants. They assist shareholders
and other stakeholders to assess the independence and objectivity in the
remuneration-setting process, including the independence of remuneration
consultants whose services may have been utilised.
There are no similar requirements in the South African Companies Act. A
notable feature of the King IV Report in this regard is that the background
statement should provide information relating to whether remuneration
consultants have been used, and whether the remuneration committee is
satisﬁed that they were independent and objective.121 This recommendation
places an emphasis on the role and the independence of external consultants
in the determination of directors’ and prescribed ofﬁcers’ remuneration.
While this is a positive development, the King IV Report is lagging behind
the detailed provisions of the 2013 Regulations in the UK in relation to
transparency in the decision-making process for the determination of the
directors’ and prescribed ofﬁcers’ remuneration.
(vii) Shareholder participation in regard to an annual directors’ remuneration report
Section 439 of the UK Companies Act, 2006 gives shareholders of a quoted
company an annual vote on a resolution to approve an annual directors’
115 Regulation 22(1)(a) of the 2013Regulations.
116 Regulation 22(1)(b) of the 2013 Regulations. This provision also applies to a
committee which considers remuneration issues when an individual is being nomi-
nated as a director. See reg 22(4) of the 2013Regulations.
117 See reg 22(1)(c)(i) of the 2013Regulations.
118 See reg 22(1)(c)(ii) of the 2013Regulations.
119 See reg 22(1)(c)(iii) of the 2013Regulations.
120 See reg 22(1)(c)(iv) of the 2013Regulations.
121 King IVReport 66 para 33d.
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remuneration report at the accounts meeting.122 An annual directors’
remuneration report must disclose the details of how the shareholders voted
at the last general meeting on the resolution to approve an annual directors’
remuneration report, as well as on the resolution to approve the directors’
remuneration policy.123 Where there was a signiﬁcant percentage of votes
against either resolution, the company is required to provide, in the
remuneration report, an explanation (to the extent that this is possible) for
those votes, and the steps taken by the directors in response to those
concerns.124 In this way shareholder engagement becomes one of the
priorities for boards and remuneration committees.
There are no equivalent provisions in the South African Companies Act.
Notably, the CompaniesAct does not provide for shareholder approval of the
remuneration report disclosed in the annual ﬁnancial statements in accor-
dance with s 30(4). In contrast, the King IV Report provides that the
remuneration implementation report should be approved by a non-binding
advisory vote of the shareholders every year.125
(e) Enhanced transparency in regard to remuneration and termination payments
The Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act, 2013, has imposed new
restrictions on directors’ remuneration and termination payments in chap 4A
of the UK Companies Act, 2006.126 According to the new restrictions, a
quoted company is prohibited from making any remuneration payment or a
payment for loss of ofﬁce to a person who is, or is to be, or has been a director
of the company unless the payment is consistent with the approved
remuneration policy or has been approved by a separate resolution of the
shareholders.127
122 In terms of s 440 of the UK Companies Act, 2006, failure to give the requisite
notice of the resolution for approval of an annual directors’ remuneration report
constitutes an offence by every ofﬁcer of the company who is in default. Section
440(2) of the UK Companies Act, 2006, provides that if the resolution is not put to a
shareholder vote at the accounts meeting, an offence is committed by each existing
director. Section 439(5) of the UK Companies Act, 2006, makes it clear that no
entitlement of a person to remuneration is made conditional on the passing of this
resolution. However, in order to give teeth to the advisory vote, the new section,
s 439A(2) of the UK Companies Act, 2006, provides that if the resolution to approve
an annual directors’ remuneration report is not passed at an accounts meeting, the
company must put the directors’ remuneration policy to shareholder approval the
following year.
123 Regulation 23(a)–(b) of the 2013Regulations.
124 Regulation 23(c) of the 2013Regulations.
125 King IVReport 67 para 37.
126 Chapter 4A of the Companies Act, 2006, was inserted by s 80 of the Enterprise
and Regulatory Reform Act, 2013. The restrictions in this chapter will come into
operation from the second ﬁnancial year beginning on or after 13 October 2013 or
during the second ﬁnancial year beginning in the year in which the company
becomes a quoted company.
127 Section 226B and 226C of the UKCompaniesAct, 2006, inserted by s 80 of the
Enterprise andRegulatoryReformAct, 2013.
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In order to enhance transparency, the new section, s 226D(1)(a) and (b) of
the UK Companies Act, 2006, provides that directors’ remuneration and
termination payments must not be approved unless a memorandum setting
out the particulars of the payment, including its amount, has been made
available for inspection by the shareholders of the company. The memoran-
dum must also explain the ways in which the payment is consistent or
inconsistent with the approved directors’ remuneration policy.128 It must be
available for shareholder inspection at the company’s ofﬁce for ﬁfteen days
prior to the date of the relevant meeting, and must also be available at the
meeting.129 Companies are therefore compelled to inform shareholders
beforehand inter alia about the nature and scale of the termination and
remuneration payments. This results in enhanced transparency in regard to
remuneration and termination payments.
The South African Companies Act does not have equivalent provisions. A
provision similar to s 227(1)(a) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 has now
been excluded by the 2008 Companies Act.130 Section 227(1)(a) of the
Companies Act of 1973 prohibited the making of any payment or the
granting of any beneﬁt or advantage by a company to ‘any director or past
director of the company or of its subsidiary company or holding company or
of any subsidiary of its holding company by way of compensation for loss of
ofﬁce or as consideration for or in connection with his retirement from
ofﬁce’, unless full particulars with respect to the proposed payment, includ-
ing the amount thereof, beneﬁt or advantage had been disclosed to
shareholders of the company, and the making of the payment or the granting
of the beneﬁt or advantage had been approved by a special resolution of the
company. It is regrettable that the current Companies Act does not contain a
similar provision, as this has removed the beneﬁts of transparency and
shareholder control over termination payments. Likewise, the JSE Listings
Requirements do not provide for shareholder approval of termination
payments. Although the King IV Report provides for disclosure of termina-
tion payments in the implementation report, it does not provide for
shareholder approval of such payments.131
(f) Format of pay disclosure
The UK Companies Act, 2006 and the 2013 Regulations deal in detail with
the format of pay disclosure in the directors’ remuneration report. Part 3 of
the 2013 Regulations contains detailed provisions for the presentation of
each of the directors’ remuneration for the relevant ﬁnancial year in tabular
and graphical forms. In terms of these requirements the remuneration reports
128 Section 226D(2) of theUKCompaniesAct, 2006.
129 Section 226D(1) of theUKCompaniesAct, 2006.
130 Section 227 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 dealt with payments to directors
for loss of ofﬁce or in connectionwith arrangements and take-over schemes.
131 King IVReport 67 para 35c.
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must be more transparent, simple and graphical so that they are easy to
navigate, understand and compare.
In contrast, the Companies Act has not directly addressed the form in
which the disclosure of directors’ remuneration must be presented. The
Companies Act also does not require disclosure of the remuneration and
beneﬁts paid to directors for the current ﬁnancial year and the preceding
ﬁnancial year. Disclosure of such information makes it easy to compare
remuneration trends with previous years. It is, however, noteworthy that the
JSE Listings Requirements do require the disclosure of the remuneration
paid to directors for the current ﬁnancial year as well as for the preceding
ﬁnancial year: but this only applies to listed companies.132
It is submitted that greater transparency in South Africa ought to be
enhanced by a requirement in the Companies Act of standardised reporting.
Emphasis should be placed on clear and more informative remuneration
reports that are easy to navigate, understand and compare with the previous
ﬁnancial years of the company. Standardised reporting would also facilitate
comparisons with other companies. The King IV Report speciﬁcally
recommends the presentation of directors’ remuneration in tabular form.133
However, the recommendations of the King IVReport in this regard are not
as detailed as the provisions of the 2013 Regulations in the UK. Moreover,
the King IV Report does not require a comparison to be made with the
previous ﬁnancial years of the company.
(g) Penalties for non-disclosure
In order to strengthen transparency, the UK Companies Act, 2006, has
prescribed speciﬁc penalties for non-compliance with its remuneration
disclosure requirements. Failure to comply with the requirement to prepare a
directors’ remuneration report for each ﬁnancial year of the company
constitutes an offence.134The offence is committed by every person who was
a director of the company immediately before the end of the period for ﬁling
accounts and reports for the ﬁnancial year in question, and failed to take all
reasonable steps for securing compliance with that requirement.135A person
guilty of the offence is liable on conviction to a ﬁne and on summary
conviction, to a ﬁne not exceeding the statutory maximum.136
If a directors’ remuneration report that does not comply with the
requirements of the UKCompaniesAct, 2006, is approved, every director of
the company who knew that the report did not so comply (or was reckless as
to whether it complied) and failed to take reasonable steps to secure
132 See para 8.63(k) of the JSE Listings Requirements.
133 TheKing IVReport 67 para 35a.
134 Adirectors’ remuneration report, as indicated above, must consist of a statement
by the remuneration chairman, a future remuneration policy, and an annual directors’
remuneration report.
135 Section 420(2)(a) and (b) of theUKCompaniesAct, 2006.
136 Section 420(3)(a) and (b) of theUKCompaniesAct, 2006.
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compliance with those requirements or to prevent the report from being
approved, commits an offence.137 A person guilty of the offence is liable on
conviction on indictment, to a ﬁne and on summary conviction, to a ﬁne not
exceeding the statutory maximum.138
In contrast, the South African Companies Act does not contain criminal
penalties for the equivalent offence. Section 77(3)(d)(i) of the CompaniesAct
provides for personal liability of a director for any loss, damages or costs
sustained by the company as a direct or indirect consequence of the director
having signed, consented to or authorised the publication of any ﬁnancial
statements that were false or misleading in a material respect, despite
knowing that the statement was false, misleading or untrue. A director may
be held jointly and severally liable with any other person who is (or may be)
held liable for the same act.139 It should be noted that the proceedings to
recover the loss, damages or costs sustained must be commenced within three
years after the particular act or omission that gave rise to the liability.140 In
other words, no action may be taken against a director after the expiry of a
period of three years after the act or omission that gave rise to the liability,
because the action will have prescribed.141
(h) Shareholder approval of directors’ remuneration payments under the Companies
Act
Section 66(8) and (9) of the South African Companies Act provides that the
company may pay remuneration to its directors for their ‘service as directors’
(except to the extent that the Memorandum of Incorporation of the
company provides otherwise) only in accordance with a special resolution of
the shareholders approved within the previous two years.As discussed earlier,
there is no deﬁnition in the Companies Act in regard to the meaning of
‘remuneration’ in the context of s 66(8) and (9), and the only deﬁnition of
‘remuneration’ in the Companies Act is contained in s 30(6), which deﬁnes
‘remuneration’ broadly for purposes of disclosure in the annual ﬁnancial
statements of a company.
It is unclear whether the approval by special resolution is required only for
directors’ services as directors (such as fees for attending board meetings), or
whether the phrase includes remuneration paid to executive directors in
137 Section 422(2)(a) and (b) of theUKCompaniesAct, 2006.
138 Section 422(3)(a) and (b) of theUKCompaniesAct, 2006.
139 Section 77(6) of the CompaniesAct.
140 Section 77(7) of the CompaniesAct.
141 It is important to note, in this context, that the Companies Act also provides for
general civil liability for a contravention of its provisions. For instance, s 20(6)(a)
affords each shareholder of a company a claim for damages against any person who
intentionally, fraudulently or due to gross negligence causes the company to do any-
thing inconsistent with the CompaniesAct. Further, any person who contravenes any
provision of the Companies Act is liable to any other person for any loss or damage
suffered by that person as a result of the contravention (see s 218(2) of the Companies
Act).
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terms of their employment contract (such as salaries and bonuses).142 Fees
paid to directors for attending board meetings are not generally signiﬁcant
compared to the fees paid to executive directors of a company in terms of
their employment contracts, which fees may be exorbitant at times.143 It is
thus not clear whether the phrase ‘service as directors’ in s 66(8) should be
narrowly interpreted to mean the fees paid to directors for attending board
meetings only or should be broadly interpreted to include the fees paid to
executive directors in terms of their service contracts.144
The interpretation of the phrase ‘service as directors’ in s 66(8) is yet to be
clariﬁed by the legislature or the courts.145 Until the phrase ‘service as
directors’ is so clariﬁed, it is suggested that the phrase should be broadly
interpreted to include remuneration paid to executive directors in terms of
their employment contracts so as not to risk contravening s 66(8) and (9) of
the Companies Act.146 As discussed earlier, it is also not clear whether the
requirement for shareholder approval by special resolution applies to cash
payments only or whether it also includes beneﬁts other than cash, as is the
case in the UK.147
Notably, the King IV Report recommends that a resolution for the
adoption of the company’s remuneration policy should be tabled to share-
holders for a non-binding advisory vote every year at the annual general
meeting.148 The King IV Report further provides for consequences where
the resolutions for the adoption of the remuneration policy or the remunera-
tion implementation report (or both) have been voted against by 25 per cent
or more of the voting rights exercised. In such an event, it is recommended
that steps should be taken in good faith and with the best reasonable effort
towards an engagement process to ascertain the reasons for the dissenting
votes, and appropriately addressing legitimate and reasonable objections and
concerns raised.149 It is recommended further that the background statement
of the remuneration policy after the voting should disclose the persons with
whom the company engaged, the manner and form of the engagement to
ascertain the reasons for the dissenting votes, as well as the steps taken to
address legitimate and reasonable objections and concerns.150 The fact that
142 Cassim et al op cit note 41 at 455.
143 Ibid at 456.
144 For a discussion of this issue see Cassim et al ibid at 455–6 and Luiz op cit note 15
at 292–6.
145 Cassim et al ibid at 456.
146 Ibid. See further Luiz op cit note 15 at 293, who agrees with adopting a broader
interpretation of the phrase ‘service as directors’.
147 See the deﬁnition of ‘remuneration payment’ in s 226A(1) of the UK Compa-
niesAct, 2006, discussed earlier.
148 King IV Report 67 para 37. The JSE has proposed that the non-binding advi-
sory vote should be a mandatory non-binding vote for listed companies in order to
enhance shareholder voice in this issue. See the proposed Amendments to the JSE
Listings Requirements of 1November 2016.
149 King IVReport 67 para 38.
150 Ibid para 39.
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the shareholder votes on the resolutions to adopt the remuneration policy,
and the remuneration implementation report are non-binding and merely
advisory, is disappointing. There is still no guarantee that company boards
will take shareholders’ concerns about the remuneration policy and the
remuneration implementation report into account.
VI PROPOSALS FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM IN SOUTH
AFRICA
It is submitted that the minimum standards of remuneration disclosure set by
the CompaniesAct are too low. Regulatory techniques developed in the UK
in regard to remuneration disclosure should be considered and, with the
necessary adaptations, introduced to strengthen South Africa’s current
remuneration-disclosure regime. The additional disclosure requirements
should apply to those companies that are presently required to comply with
the disclosure requirements of s 30(4), as discussed in part IV above.
We argue that the disclosure requirements in s 30(4) of the Companies Act
should be strengthened by requiring companies to disclose further informa-
tion in regard to the remuneration of directors as set out below:
• The Companies Act should have a requirement for the disclosure of a
separate remuneration policy equivalent to that of the director’s remu-
neration policy in the UK. Greater transparency in relation to the
remuneration policy provides insights into how the remuneration of
directors is structured, and into the underlying drivers of the individual
remuneration packages.
• The Companies Act should provide for stronger shareholder and
employee participation in the remuneration policy. The remuneration
policy should indicate whether any views expressed by the shareholders
to the company were taken into account in the formulation of the
remuneration policy. It should also explain how the pay and employ-
ment conditions of the company’s employees were considered when
setting the policy for the directors’ remuneration.
• The Companies Act should require disclosure on how the amount spent
on directors’ remuneration compares to that spent on other important
payments, the remuneration of employees, distributions to shareholders
and investments. Pay-ratio disclosures should be mandated by legislation,
and companies should be required to show how the increase in the
remuneration of the directors compares to that of the company’s
employees.
• The Companies Act should require companies to provide sufﬁcient
information on the link between remuneration and performance. The
performance criteria, including performance measures, weightings and
targets on which variable remuneration is based must be clearly disclosed
and justiﬁed. This would ensure greater transparency in relation to the
link between remuneration and performance.
• The Companies Act should require the disclosure of sufﬁcient informa-
tion relating to the decision-making process that was utilised for
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determining the remuneration of directors, including stakeholder con-
sultations. Companies should be required to disclose the identity and
independence of all the persons who were involved in the remuneration-
setting process during the relevant ﬁnancial year. This would compel
companies to focus on transparency in the decision-making process used
for determining executive directors’ remuneration, and would assist
stakeholders to assess the issues of independence and objectivity in the
remuneration-setting process.
• There must be disclosure of the company’s principles on which the
determination of payments for loss of ofﬁce will be approached.
• The Companies Act should require the remuneration of directors to be
published in a clear and standardised manner that is easy to read, assess and
comprehend. It must also be presented in a format that is transparent,
simple and graphical that will be easy to navigate and understand, and
which will facilitate comparisons with remuneration trends in previous
ﬁnancial years of the company and with those of other companies.
• The Companies Act should provide for harsher penalties for the failure to
comply with the disclosure requirements, in order to strengthen trans-
parency.
• South Africa should consider adopting formal shareholder approval for
board decisions on remuneration policies and on remuneration pay-
ments. Shareholder approval should be sought for both board fees and
the remuneration paid to executive directors under their service con-
tracts with the company.
• The term ‘remuneration’ should be clearly deﬁned in the Companies
Act, and not only for purposes of s 30(4) and (5) of the Companies Act,
and should include cash payments and other beneﬁts.
• Listed companies should be required to have the equivalent of an annual
directors’ remuneration report as required by the UK Companies Act,
2006, setting out how the approved remuneration policy was imple-
mented in the relevant ﬁnancial year and in the previous ﬁnancial year.
• Listed companies should also be required to disclose communication by
the remuneration committee chairperson summarising for the relevant
ﬁnancial year the major decisions on directors’ remuneration, any
substantial changes relating to directors’ remuneration made during the
year and the context in which those changes occurred.
VII CONCLUSION
The remuneration of directors has emerged as a contentious issue in various
jurisdictions in view of the role that exorbitant remuneration packages are
thought to have played in contributing to the global ﬁnancial crisis, as well as
the damaging impact that they may have on various company stakeholders.
As we have discussed, the escalating levels of the remuneration of directors
may also exacerbate the income inequalities and labour unrest in South
Africa, and threaten social cohesion. The remuneration-setting process is to a
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large extent characterised by insufﬁcient transparency and a lack of proce-
dural fairness, as well as a high possibility of conﬂict of interests of directors
with those of shareholders and other company stakeholders.
One way of managing the escalating levels of the remuneration of
directors is to compel companies to disclose the details of the remuneration
packages of directors, the process by which they are determined and their
links to performance. Full remuneration disclosure would increase transpar-
ency and openness in the remuneration-setting process, as well as the board’s
accountability to shareholders and other company stakeholders.
This article has assessed the adequacy of the disclosure of directors’
remuneration in terms of the Companies Act, the King IV Report and the
JSE Listings Requirements in light of the minimum standards for the
disclosure of directors’ remuneration in the UK Companies Act, 2006, the
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act, 2013 and the 2013 Regulations.
The article has focused on the information relating to directors’ remunera-
tion that is required to be disclosed as part of the annual ﬁnancial reporting
process, the manner in which the information is to be disclosed, employee
and shareholder participation, approval of directors’ remuneration, as well as
the penalties for non-compliance with the disclosure requirements. It is
submitted that the South African Companies Act is lagging behind the UK
legislation in these respects. The King IV Report has taken positive steps in
relation to remuneration disclosure which are in line with the approach
under the UK legislation. However, the principles of the King IV Report, as
was the case with the King III Report, are voluntary and non-binding, save
for listed companies.
Although s 30(4) of the Companies Act is comparable to the provisions
relating to the disclosure of an annual directors’ remuneration report in the
UK in so far as it requires disclosure of the various components of the total
remuneration package, the Companies Act does not go as far as the UK
legislation. Section 30(4) does not require companies to disclose the
benchmarks that were used to determine the directors’ remuneration and
thus fails to address the link between remuneration and performance. This
section has also not addressed the critical issue of stakeholder consultation in
the remuneration setting process. There is no requirement to disclose how
the amount spent on directors’ remuneration compares to that spent on other
important payments, the remuneration of employees, distributions to share-
holders, and investments. Greater transparency in the remuneration-setting
process is required, as well as a standardised manner of publishing the
remuneration payment details of directors that is simple, and easy to navigate
and understand. Furthermore, the remuneration information disclosed in
terms of s 30(4) of the Companies Act is not subject to formal shareholder
approval and the requirement in s 66(9) of the Companies Act that the
remuneration of directors for their services as such must be approved by a
special resolution of the shareholders lacks clarity and certainty. The
non-binding advisory vote of the shareholders on the resolution to adopt the
remuneration policy in the King IVReport is disappointing.
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We argue that the minimum standards of disclosure of directors’ remuner-
ation under the Companies Act are inadequate to satisfy enhanced transpar-
ency and the board’s accountability to company stakeholders. Thus, it is
imperative that the remuneration disclosure rules in s 30(4) of the Compa-
nies Act should be strengthened. Legislative techniques developed in the UK
with regard to remuneration disclosure should be considered and, with the
necessary adaptations, introduced in the Companies Act. Legislating com-
prehensive remuneration-disclosure rules will be in line with the stated
objective of s 7(b)(iii) of the Companies Act to promote the South African
economy by encouraging transparency and high standards of corporate
governance, given the role that companies play in the country’s social and
economic life.
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